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THE SUPREME COURT'S DURA DECISION
UNFORTUNATELY SECURES A BRIGHTER
FUTURE FOR 10b-5 DEFENDANTS
INTRODUCTION
Federal securities legislation has been prevalent in the United
States since the Great Depression. Congress passed the Securities Act
of 19331 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (1934
Act) (collectively, the Acts) in an attempt to increase investor confi-
dence. 3 The legislature believed that an upsurge in investor confi-
dence would promote investment, which would in turn cause "capital
formation, economic growth, and job creation."'4
The Acts imposed "comprehensive disclosure responsibilities for
companies issuing securities to the public," and they contained new
causes of action created solely to enforce such responsibilities.5 Con-
gress enacted two methods of enforcing the Acts: (1) the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) could directly enforce specific pro-
visions of the Acts; and (2) private investors could recover for dam-
ages resulting from violations of the Acts by bringing causes of action
afforded to investors by the Acts.6 In addition, federal courts ex-
panded the scope of the Acts to allow private rights of action even
where Congress did not expressly create them.7
The passage of the Acts caused securities litigation to increase. This
trend continued into the 1990s, when plaintiffs filed a total of 164 fed-
eral securities class actions in 1991, 202 in 1992, 163 in 1993, and 233 in
1994.8 The proliferation of securities litigation eventually forced Con-
gress to reevaluate the Acts. The Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs (the Committee), created to investigate securities
issues, became concerned that lawyers were bringing frivolous
1. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000)).
2. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm).
3. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
4. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
5. Brian E. Pastuszenski & Inez H. Friedman-Boyce, Back to Basic-Challenging the Applica-
tion of the Efficient Market Hypothesis in Federal Securities Lawsuits, SKO80 ALI-ABA 907, 909
(2005).
6. Id. at 910.
7. Id.
8. Sherrie R. Savett, Securities Class Actions Since the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiff's Perspec-
tive, 1505 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 17, 30 (2005).
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"strike" lawsuits alleging securities law violations with the hope that
corporations would settle to avoid litigation costs.9 Congress found
that these suits were usually groundless, unnecessarily increased the
costs of raising capital, and involved the same repeat plaintiffs.'0 The
Committee may not have considered, however, that the increase in
securities litigation might also have been attributable to a rise in de-
ceptive practices."
To combat frivolous securities lawsuits, Congress passed the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).12 Congress in-
tended that the PSLRA "lower the cost of raising capital by combat-
ting [securities law] abuses, while maintaining the incentive for
bringing meritorious actions."'1 3 Despite the problems that arose from
securities fraud actions, Congress implied that direct shareholder suits
were still critical to the continued stability of American markets. 14
For that reason, Congress left much of federal securities regulation
untouched and made only certain particular aspects of securities fraud
more difficult to plead. 15 For example, Congress did not impose a
higher pleading burden for loss causation.16
In spite of Congress's determination that private securities fraud ac-
tions were still essential to the regulatory scheme, the dismissal rate
following the enactment of the PSLRA more than doubled (11.2%
9. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
10. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
11. The author simply notes that in hindsight of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, perhaps
an escalation of securities lawsuits in the 1990s was not without reason. Cf Savett, supra note 8,
at 23.
12. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
13. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683. Congress stated its
goals for the PSLRA:
(1) to encourage the voluntary disclosure of information by corporate issuers; (2) to
empower investors so that they-not their lawyers-exercise primary control over pri-
vate securities litigation; and (3) to encourage plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue valid claims
and defendants to fight abusive claims.
Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
14. Cf Brief for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 4, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932)
("The [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act] codified the private right of action for securities
fraud .... ).
15. See Brief of State of New Jersey Department of the Treasury & Its Division of Investment
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336
(2005) (No. 03-932) [hereinafter State of New Jersey] ("[Ilt is not appropriate to interpret every
provision of the PSLRA as though it was intended to heighten plaintiffs' burden at the outset of
a case .... Although the PSLRA does contain specific provisions intended to impose height-
ened pleading burdens ... the loss causation provision is not among them.").
16. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694; see also Geb-
hardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 830 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) ("The [PSLRA] does not
change traditional pleading rules with respect to [loss causation].").
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dismissal rate before the PSLRA to 25.1% after its enactment). 17
Some believed that this dramatic increase in the dismissal rate demon-
strated that federal courts were too stringent in applying the PSLRA,
and that the only way to assure the continued efficacy of private secur-
ities fraud actions was for federal courts to apply normal pleading
standards where Congress did not expressly legislate otherwise.' 8
This Note focuses on loss causation, a subject which the Supreme
Court recently addressed in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.19
Part II provides a backdrop of basic securities fraud actions (including
the elements of a fraud action) with a focus on what burdens a plain-
tiff must meet.20 It also shows how circuit courts have employed dif-
ferent standards in determining the pleading and proof requirements
of loss causation. 21 Part III elucidates the holdings of the Dura deci-
sion.22 Part IV evaluates the Dura decision, concluding that the
Court's adoption of common-law precedent did not fully consider the
legislative history of the PSLRA, and that the resulting standard is too
oppressive on plaintiffs.2 3 Part V observes the present impact on se-
curities litigation and predicts future trends. 24
II. BACKGROUND
This Part will provide a backdrop for why it was necessary for Con-
gress to codify securities law legislation.25 It will describe the actual
securities law enacted by Congress 26 and explicate the circuit courts'
loss causation approaches. 27
A. Congressional Hearings Leading Up to the PSLRA
In response to mounting concerns regarding the increasing number
of securities fraud actions, Congress held committee hearings to deter-
mine what reforms were essential to deter capricious securities law-
17. Brief for James J. Hayes as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6-7, Dura Pharms.,
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932).
18. See, e.g., State of New Jersey, supra note 15, at 5.
19. 544 U.S. 336 (2005); see also infra notes 86-112 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 28-50 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 51-85 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 86-112 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 113-179 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 180-250 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 51-85 and accompanying text.
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Suits.28 The Committee noted that plaintiffs typically brought
securities fraud actions under the "'catch-all' fraud provision in Sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act."'29 Congress did not originally provide for
private 10(b) actions; rather, federal courts inferred that Congress had
authorized such actions.30 Due to judicial lawmaking, conflicting legal
standards developed that created significant "opportunities for abuses
of investors, issuers, professional firms and others. '31 As a result,
Congress sought to reassert its authority over securities law and
passed the PSLRA in 1995.32
In drafting the PSLRA, Congress intended to stabilize securities
law by empowering investors-not their attorneys-to initiate and re-
cover from securities actions.33 Testimony presented to Congress at
the PSLRA hearings indicated that lawyers were instigating share-
holder suits, usually with the aid of "professional" plaintiffs, 34 and that
investors were typically recovering "only 7 to 14 cents for every dollar
lost as a result of securities fraud." 35
The Committee decided that establishing a stringent pleading stan-
dard would be one way to slow the onslaught of groundless securities
actions.36 Yet the Committee did not necessarily intend for this
heightened standard to apply to every aspect of the complaint. The
Committee resolved that a plaintiff should have to prove loss causa-
tion, and an acceptable avenue for proving this loss would be "to
prove that the price at which the plaintiff bought the stock was artifi-
cially inflated as the result of the misstatement or omission. ' 37 Con-
spicuous in its absence was any requirement that the plaintiff prove a
subsequent loss. The Committee stated that a defendant would have
the burden of proving that factors other than the fraud caused or con-
tributed to the loss. 38 Despite the Committee's intent not to raise the
28. S. REp. No. 104-98, at 1 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 679 ("On June 17,
1993 and July 21, 1993, the Subcommittee on Securities held hearings on private securities
litigation.").
29. Id. at 4, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
30. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
31. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
32. Id. at 4-5, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683-84.
33. Id. at 6, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685.
34. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (stating that "profes-
sional" plaintiffs in the securities law context are ones who, because they have many shares in
numerous companies, frequently lend their names to securities fraud lawsuits).
35. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685.
36. Id. at 15, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
37. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
38. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 ("The defendant would then have the op-
portunity to prove any mitigating circumstances, or that factors unrelated to the fraud contrib-
uted to the loss.").
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pleading standard for loss causation, Congress may have inadvertently
erected hurdles too high for plaintiffs to clear by not explicitly codify-
ing what is required. 39
B. Securities Law Codified
The PSLRA codified private securities fraud actions and requires
that a plaintiff (1) allege that the defendant made a false statement of
a consequential fact or omitted such a material fact from a statement;
(2) allege that the defendant made his statement or omission with a
particular state of mind; and (3) prove that the material misstatement
or omission caused the plaintiff to suffer damages. 40 The Supreme
Court has extrapolated from these essentials of securities fraud ac-
tions the following prima facie elements: (1) a material misrepresen-
tation or omission;41 (2) a wrongful state of mind (scienter);42 (3) a
connection with the security purchase;43 (4) reliance by the plaintiff on
the misrepresentation or omission, i.e., "transaction causation; ' 44 (5)
economic loss; 45 and (6) loss causation. 46
39. Cf. Savett, supra note 8, at 23. Savett recognizes this possibility:
Unfortunately, the erection of litigation hurdles . . . may have been a contributing
factor in the massive proliferation of corporate fraud. With major financial scandals
dominating the news over the last few years, it is clear that Congress should have been
concerned with protecting public investors from corporate America's abuses-not pro-
tecting the corporate elite by fostering an atmosphere favorable to fraud.
Id.; see also Brief for James J. Hayes, supra note 17, at 7 ("A fraud suit against WorldCom was
dismissed just three months before the company's internal auditor alerted directors and the pub-
lic about WorldCom's fraudulent overstatement of earnings that led to its bankruptcy."); 2 HAR-
OLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURMEs LAW HANDBOOK § 25:5 (2006) ("With some notable
exceptions, plaintiffs' bar has not fared well on the judicial front in cases construing the
[PSLRA].").
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l)-(4) (2000).
41. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 n.6 (1988) ("It shall be unlawful for any person
... [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made .... " (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987))).
42. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) ("[Rule] 10(b) was addressed to
practices that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negli-
gent conduct alone.").
43. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975).
44. The Supreme Court allows plaintiffs to plead transaction causation based upon the "fraud-
on-the-market" theory. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243. In other words, plaintiffs may meet the transac-
tion causation requirement by pleading "that a defendant's material misrepresentation was a
fraud-on-the-market that artificially inflated the stock price on which investors relied." Laurie
Smilan, Issuer Class Actions: Noteworthy Decisions and Trends of 2004/2005, 1505 PRACTISING
L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 203, 209 (2005).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
46. Id.; THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.11[3] (5th ed. 2005)
("[Tlhe plaintiff must be able to prove 'loss causation': namely that the plaintiff's injury (gener-
ally the diminution in the value of his or her investment) is directly attributable both to the
wrongful conduct and the form and manner in which the challenged transaction occurred.").
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Congress did not achieve its goal of eliminating the instability in
securities law with the passage of the PSLRA legislation. Federal
courts were-and still are-applying varying and sometimes conflict-
ing approaches to the PSLRA.47 One of the most notorious discrep-
ancies among the federal courts involves loss causation. 48 Loss
causation compels the plaintiff in a securities fraud action to prove
that the defendant's act or omission actually brought about a loss for
which the plaintiff seeks compensation. 49 Ultimately, the Court
granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit case, Broudo v. Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., to address loss causation issues.50
C. Circuit Courts' Loss Causation Standards Prior to Dura
To understand why Supreme Court review was imperative, it is nec-
essary to analyze the discrepancies that existed among the circuit
court interpretations. Comparing the Second Circuit and Third Cir-
cuit approaches with that of the Ninth Circuit demonstrates the scope
of the incongruity among the appellate courts.
The Third Circuit articulated its principles of loss causation plead-
ing in Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.51 The Semerenko court reviewed
past Third Circuit holdings and reiterated that "where the claimed loss
involves the purchase of a security at a price that is inflated due to an
alleged misrepresentation, there is a sufficient causal nexus between
the loss and the alleged misrepresentation to satisfy the loss causation
requirement. '5 2 The court noted that this principle assumes that the
fall in price was due to subsequent disclosure of the misrepresenta-
tion.53 This assumption is significant because although the Third Cir-
cuit requires a price drop,54 it does not demand that the plaintiffs
specifically plead the causal chain. The alleged misrepresentations
need not be the sole cause of the decline in value; "[s]o long as the
alleged misrepresentations were a substantial cause of the inflation in
47. Smilan, supra note 44, at 207 ("Although the [PSLRA] was enacted nearly a decade ago,
its key provisions continue to be litigated and their contours determined-and not always uni-
formly-by the federal courts.").
48. Cf. id. at 207-12.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
50. 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 936 (2004), rev'd, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
51. 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000).
52. Id. at 184.
53. Id. at 184-85.
54. Id. at 185 ("Where the value of the security does not actually decline as a result of an
alleged misrepresentation, it cannot be said that there is in fact an economic loss attributable to
that misrepresentation.").
[Vol. 56:189
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the price of a security and in its subsequent decline in value, other
contributing forces will not bar recovery. 55
The Third Circuit then applied those concepts to the complaint. In
Semerenko, the plaintiff alleged that the market price of the stock di-
minished in value as a result of the alleged fraud. 56 From that allega-
tion, the court found it reasonable to infer that when the
misrepresentation was disclosed to the public, the disclosure signifi-
cantly contributed to the subsequent decline in value.57 To summa-
rize, the Third Circuit required the plaintiff to plead that (1) he or she
bought at an inflated price; (2) the inflated price was due to a misrep-
resentation or omission; (3) the stock price later dropped; and (4) the
misrepresentation was a substantial cause of the decline in value.
The Second Circuit applied a more stringent standard than the
Third Circuit in Emergent Capital Investment Management, L.L.C. v.
Stonepath Group, Inc.58 The court began by requiring that the plain-
tiff "demonstrate that its injuries were caused by defendants' omission
[or misrepresentation] of material information." 59 In addition, it ap-
plied the proximate cause concept of tort law to loss causation, so that
a plaintiff's damages resulting from the omission or misrepresentation
must be foreseeable. 60 Although these principles may seem broad,
the Second Circuit actually utilized a rigorous proximate cause
analysis.
The Second Circuit's benchmark for pleading loss causation is de-
ceptively high due to its tendency to impose strict standards for prov-
ing proximate cause. 61 The Emergent court noted that the plaintiff
asserted that the defendants' omissions were the proximate cause of
his loss. 62 Such a conclusory statement would have met the Third Cir-
cuit's more liberal pleading standard, but it did not satisfy the Second
Circuit. The court continued its examination, however, by noting that
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were involved in a "pump
and dump" scheme63 in addition to omitting material facts. 64 The
court relied on both the proximate cause allegation and the specific
55. Id. at 186-87.
56. Id. at 187.
57. Semerenko, 233 F.3d at 187.
58. 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003).
59. Id. at 196.
60. Id. at 197.
61. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
62. 343 F.3d at 197.
63. Id. A "pump and dump" scheme occurs "where the company principals artificially in-
flate[] [the company] stock prices before 'dumping' their own shares of [the company] stock on
the market." Id.; see HAZEN, supra note 46, § 14.18.
64. Emergent, 343 F.3d at 197.
2006]
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facts of the alleged "pump and dump" scheme to find the plaintiff had
adequately pled proximate causation and loss causation. 65 Further-
more, the court called its holding a "close one," with the plaintiff pre-
vailing only because the facts were read in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party on a motion to dismiss. 66 Stated another way,
the Second Circuit "require[d] a showing both that 'the loss be fore-
seeable and that the loss be caused by the materialization of the con-
cealed risk'-that is, something beyond 'bare proximate cause.'
' 67
The Second Circuit's pleading standard thus imposes the greatest bur-
den on plaintiffs. 68
The Ninth Circuit employed the most permissive-and plaintiff-
friendly-loss causation pleading requirements of any circuit,69 which
is why the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari. The Ninth
Circuit employed its liberal standard in Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. 70 In Broudo, the plaintiffs were stockholders who purchased
"Dura Pharmaceutical securities between April 15, 1977, and Febru-
65. Id. at 197-98.
66. Id. "[The Second Circuit] review[s] a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and accepting its allegations as true." Hollander v. Flash Dancers Topless Club, No. 04-6700,
2006 WL 267148, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2006) (citing Desiano v. Warner-Lambert Co., 326 F.3d
339, 347 (2d Cir. 2003)).
67. Evan R. Chesler & J. Stephen Beke, Loss Causation Post-Dura, 1517 PRAcTISING L. INST.
CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1277, 1280-81 (2005) (quoting In re Initial Pub.
Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 298, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
68. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 ("Regarded as
the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff plead facts
that give rise to a 'strong inference' of defendant's fraudulent intent." (citation omitted)); cf.
Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 175 (2d Cir. 2005) ("To plead loss causation, the
complaints must allege facts that support an inference that [defendant's] misstatements and
omissions concealed the circumstances that bear upon the loss suffered such that plaintiffs would
have been spared all or an ascertainable portion of that loss absent the fraud.").
69. The Eleventh Circuit and Eighth Circuit had their own approaches, but each was similar
to other circuits. The Eleventh Circuit applied an intermediate approach before the Supreme
Court's decision in Dura. In Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit stated that a
plaintiff must show that the defendant's act proximately caused his loss, or in other words, "the
misrepresentation touches upon the reasons for the investment's decline in value." 116 F.3d
1441, 1447 (1lth Cir. 1997) (quoting Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th
Cir. 1981)). Under this theory, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant's act caused him to
purchase the security and that the defendant's act caused the subsequent decline in stock price.
Id. at 1448. There was no comprehensive proximate causation analysis here as there was in the
Second Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit adopted the same approach as the Ninth Circuit did prior to Dura. See
Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Circuit held that
"plaintiffs [may] invoke the fraud-on-the-market theory and assume that the misrepresentations
inflated the stock's price. Paying more for something than it is worth is damaging." Id. The
circuit court continued, "[mioreover, our causation requirement for damages is not very strin-
gent." Id.
70. 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
PLEADING LOSS CAUSATION
ary 24, 1998 (the class period)."' 71 During the class period, Dura re-
leased several statements that it was doing well and that one of its
products was slated for FDA approval.72 "On the last day of the class
period," Dura publicly announced that its earnings were not as high as
it had stated and that its product would not obtain FDA approval. 73
Dura stock plummeted 47% that day-from $391/8 to $203/4. 7 4 The
plaintiffs alleged that Dura knew all along that its earlier statements
were erroneous and that those statements induced the plaintiffs to
purchase stock at an inflated price.75
The Ninth Circuit first stated that "loss causation is satisfied where
'the plaintiff shows that the misrepresentation [or omission] touches
upon the reasons for the investment's decline in value,"' and admitted
that "touches upon" is ambiguous.76 The court reviewed previous
cases and asserted that it employed the fraud-on-the-market ap-
proach: "[P]laintiffs establish loss causation if they have shown that
the price on the date of purchase was inflated because of the
misrepresentation. ' 77
To elaborate on the fraud-on-the-market theory, the court held that
the injury occurred at the time the plaintiff bought the stock at an
inflated price, and therefore no subsequent drop in the market price
of the stock need actually occur.78 Moreover, the court noted, "for a
cause of action to accrue, it is not necessary that a disclosure and sub-
sequent drop in the market price of the stock have actually occurred,
because the injury occurs at the time of the transaction. ' 79 Accord-
ingly, damages are to be measured starting at the exact moment the
stock was bought at an inflated price. 80 In a footnote, the court com-
71. Id. at 935 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 936.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 939-40.
76. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 937-38 (quoting McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 821 (9th Cir.
1992)).
77. Id. at 938 (quoting Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996)).
78. Id. Theoretically this is true; the moment a buyer purchases at an inflated price, the seller
has fraudulently gained. Nonetheless, an issue arises when the buyer immediately turns around
and sells his stock for the same inflated purchase price at which he bought. The initial buyer
thereby transfers the loss to the subsequent buyer. Some courts and commentators fear that
applying the fraud-on-the-market theory would allow both the initial buyer and the subsequent
buyer to recover against a defendant. Such a fear, however, is misplaced and is addressed later
in this Note. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
79. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938.
80. Id.
2006]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
mented that other circuits were "less favorable to plaintiffs," but it did
not explain why it disagreed with those approaches. 81
The court then applied its unique principles to the facts of
Broudo.82 The plaintiff-appellants pled that the stock price was over-
valued, at least "in part due to the misrepresentations by [defen-
dant]."' 83 The court held that in the pleading, it was only necessary for
the plaintiff to allege (1) that the price of the stock at the time of
procurement was inflated and, (2) that the cause of the overvaluation
was the misrepresentation or omission by the defendant. 84 Because
the plaintiff-appellants pled that the stock price-at least partly due to
misrepresentations by the defendant-was overvalued, the court held
that the complaint survived the pleading stage.85
III. SUBJECT OPINION:
DURA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V. BROUDO
The Court granted certiorari "because the Ninth Circuit's views
about loss causation differ from those of other Circuits that have con-
sidered this issue."8s6 The Court began by commenting on the com-
plaint, stating that "the complaint says the following (and nothing
significantly more than the following) about economic losses attribu-
table to the spray device misstatement: 'In reliance on the integrity of
the market, [the plaintiffs].., paid artificially inflated prices for Dura
securities' and the plaintiffs suffered 'damage[s]' thereby.18 7 The Court
then turned to the Ninth Circuit's loss causation standard.
A. Supreme Court's Rejection of the Ninth Circuit's Approach
The Court stated flatly that the Ninth Circuit's holding was
"wrong. '8 8 Inflated purchase price does not, by itself, prove loss cau-
sation.8 9 The Court reasoned that at the precise moment when an in-
vestor purchases stock, he has not suffered a loss.90 If the investor
immediately sold the stock, he would have both bought and sold at the
81. Id. at 938 n.4.
82. For clarification purposes, this Note will refer to the Ninth Circuit's Broudo v. Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. decision as Broudo, and will refer to the Supreme Court's reversal as
Dura.
83. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 939.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005).
87. Id. at 339-40 (alterations in original).
88. Id. at 338.
89. Id. at 342.
90. Id.
[Vol. 56:189
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inflated price and never accrued a loss.91 Such trading behavior is
known as "in-and-out trading. ' 92 In theory, no loss occurs from a mis-
representation if the purchaser of the inflated stock later sells at a
reduced price, but the diminished value is a result of changed eco-
nomic circumstances and not the result of the misrepresentation or
omission.93 Moreover, the longer the interval of time between
purchase and subsequent sale, the more probable it becomes that any
reduction in the stock's value is due to factors other than the misrep-
resentation that artificially raised the price of the stock. 94 The Court
concluded that the "most logic alone permits us to say is that the
higher purchase price will sometimes play a role in bringing about a
future loss." '95
91. Id. at 342-43.
92. Lower courts have expended considerable time elucidating the alleged havoc that "in-and-
out" traders would wreak on securities fraud actions. The concern is that if courts universally
apply the Ninth Circuit's "fraud-on-the-market" theory, then double recoveries against defend-
ants would be commonplace. Consider the following example: A buys stock from Company C
at an inflated price, but then sells his stock to B at the same price at which he bought. Company
C then issues a corrective disclosure and B subsequently loses five dollars a share. Some courts
fret that the Ninth Circuit's approach would allow both A and B to bring successful 10b-5 actions
against Company C, resulting in Company C having to pay twice for one actual loss. Such appre-
hension is validated if courts strictly apply what is known as the "out-of-pocket rule" to measur-
ing damages:
[The out-of-pocket rule] measures the difference between the value of the security at
the time the plaintiff bought (or sold). [sic] and the price the plaintiff paid (or re-
ceived). For each purchase in a case in which the plaintiff class alleges price inflation,
the damage is the price paid, minus the price at which the stock would have traded
absent the fraud, multiplied by the number of shares bought.
William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?
54 EMORY L.J. 843, 875-76 (2005) (citation omitted). There are some commentators, however,
that believe concerns about double recovery in this context are groundless. See infra note 131.
Commentators who are pro-defendant may challenge that the larger problem securities com-
panies face-namely, having to either foot the bill for expensive litigation or settle a meritless
case in order to cut their losses-is not addressed. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932) ("So great is the pressure on corporations to settle that, even
when defendants do succeed in obtaining a trial court dismissal, the risk of losing on appeal can
still lead to enormous settlements."). This Note responds that all corporations face similar issues
when confronted with a lawsuit of any nature, and there seems to be no reason to give securities
fraud defendants extra care beyond what Congress specifically granted corporations when
adopting the PSLRA. Moreover, the Chamber of Commerce's argument seems overblown in
light of the fact that when a defendant wins at the trial stage, that win gives the defendant a
significant bargaining chip when deciding how much to settle for in order to avoid an appeal.
Any further costs are just the nature of doing business. Congress sought to impose higher plead-
ing standards in passing the PSLRA; it did not seek to make securities fraud claims impossible
for plaintiffs to prove, and it did not seek to place an impenetrable 10b-5 shield around
corporations.
93. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342-43.
94. Id. at 343.
95. Id.
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In addition to attacking the logic of the Ninth Circuit's standard, the
Court denounced it as inconsistent with precedent. Private securities
fraud actions, according to the Court, resemble common-law deceit
and misrepresentation actions, wherein a plaintiff must show that, had
he known the truth, (1) he would not have acted, and (2) he would not
have suffered actual economic loss. 96 Due to the common-law roots
of securities fraud claims, the Court noted that other circuits have re-
jected the "inflated purchase price" approach. 97 Quoting from the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, the Court said that "a person who
'misrepresents the financial condition of a corporation in order to sell
its stock' becomes liable to a relying purchaser 'for the loss' the pur-
chaser sustains 'when the facts . .. become generally known' and 'as a
result' share value 'depreciate[s].' ,,98 Therefore, the Court could not
reconcile the Ninth Circuit's method with that of other circuits:
"[T]he uniqueness of its perspective argues against the validity of its
approach." 99 Because private securities fraud actions were judicially
created actions prior to the passage of the PSLRA-and thus had
roots in common law-the Court held that the circuit court ap-
proaches that applied the common law were correct. 100
Finally, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's proffered approach as
being contrary to the traditional objectives of securities law.10' The
Court said that the goal of securities regulations was to maintain the
public's trust in the marketplace.10 2 But the statutes were not broad
insurance plans against market loss; they only protected against losses
that fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions actually caused. 0 3
B. What a Plaintiff Must Allege for Loss Causation
After analyzing what a plaintiff must prove for loss causation, the
Court turned to the question of what a plaintiff must plead to survive
dismissal. 0 4 The Court began by referring to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which require only "a short and plain statement of
96. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). One commentator disagrees
with the Court that common-law fraud actions serve as a proper analogue for fraud-on-the-
market cases. See Fox, infra note 131.
97. Dura, 544 U.S. at 344.
98. Id. at 345 (alterations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A
cmt. b).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1977)).
103. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347-48 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988)).
104. Id. at 346-48.
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the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' 10 5 Even under
this minimal condition, however, the Court noted that the "'short and
plain statement' must provide the defendant with 'fair notice of what
the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' "106
The plaintiffs' complaint in Broudo had only one statement refer-
ring to the loss: "[T]hat the plaintiffs paid artificially inflated prices
for Dura['s] securities and suffered damage[s].' 1' 7 Because the com-
plaint did not mention anything about a subsequent drop in price, the
Court inferred that the plaintiffs were contending that merely alleging
an inflated price was sufficient for adducing loss causation.10 8
As the Court stated, an "artificially inflated purchase price" itself
will not prove loss causation, and the complaint did not contain any-
thing else that would notify the defendants of what economic loss the
plaintiffs actually suffered. 109 Despite conceding that notice pleading
is not intended to be burdensome on plaintiffs, the Court found that
providing a defendant "with some indication of the loss and the causal
connection that the plaintiff has in mind" is not too heavy of a load for
a plaintiff to shoulder110 Furthermore, the Court echoed the senti-
ments of Congress when it declared that a failure to impose such a
requirement would permit plaintiffs to bring groundless claims that
alleged substantial amounts of loss in the hopes that the discovery
process would reveal concrete evidence of loss, thereby giving
credence to an otherwise disingenuous claim."' The Court concluded
by saying that it did not want to transform private securities actions
into broad shareholder insurance policies-sentiments which once
again stemmed from the PSLRA congressional hearings. 12
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part will demonstrate how the Court failed to comprehensively
consider the legislative history of the PSLRA in arriving at its loss
causation standard' 1 3 and illuminate how the Court relied on faulty
common-law principles. 1 4 It will expound on how the Court, by not
erecting an exact loss causation standard and by not considering re-
105. Id. at 346 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
106. Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
107. Id. at 347 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id. at 346-47.
109. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347.
110. Id.
111. See id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)).
112. Id. at 347-48.
113. See infra notes 116-127 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 128-150 and accompanying text.
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lated securities-law issues, left the issue of loss causation just as am-
biguous as it was before Dura."15
A. Dura Decision Did Not Thoroughly Consider PSLRA
Legislative History
The Supreme Court's holding in Dura is consistent with the ap-
proach taken by a majority of circuits, but it disregards the Commit-
tee's intentions regarding the PSLRA. After the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
federal courts had increasingly created their own securities causes of
action-essentially fashioning securities common law where there had
been none.116 Congress passed the PSLRA to reinstate congressional
authority over securities regulation. 117 The majority of circuits had
been applying common-law standards to interpret the PSLRA-par-
ticularly when addressing the pleading standards for loss causation. 118
The Supreme Court adopted the common-law approach to loss causa-
tion without fully taking into account the legislative history of the
PSLRA. 119
At the congressional hearings for the consideration and passage of
the PSLRA, the Committee explicitly stated which elements of a se-
curities fraud action must be pled with particularity.1 20 The Commit-
tee chose the Second Circuit's pleading standard as the appropriate
benchmark for pleading the circumstances surrounding the fraud.121
The Committee decided that plaintiffs must plead "allegations of
fraud with 'particularity.' 1 22 They must specifically identify each al-
legedly misleading statement, state why it was deceptive, and explain
how they relied on the statement. 123
The Committee then discussed loss causation:
115. See infra notes 151-179 and accompanying text.
116. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
117. See id. at 5, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 684.
118. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005) ("Given the common-law
roots of the securities fraud action (and the common-law requirement that a plaintiff show actual
damages), it is not surprising that other Courts of Appeals have rejected the Ninth Circuit's
'inflated purchase price' approach to proving causation and loss.").
119. See id.
120. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
121. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694. The committee discussed the Second
Circuit's standard:
Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Circuit requires that the
plaintiff plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference" of defendant's fraudulent in-
tent. The Committee does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's caselaw interpret-
ing this pleading standard, although courts may find this body of law instructive.
Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 (citations omitted).
122. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
123. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
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The Committee also requires the plaintiff to show that the mis-
statement or loss alleged in the complaint caused the loss incurred
by the plaintiff. For example, the plaintiff would have to prove that
the price at which the plaintiff bought the stock was artificially in-
flated as a result of the misstatement or omission. The defendant
would then have the opportunity to prove any mitigating circum-
stances, or that factors unrelated to the fraud contributed to the
lOSS.124
Clearly and unambiguously, the Committee recited the exact standard
of loss causation that the Ninth Circuit utilized.125 These statements
elucidate that while Congress intended to heighten pleading standards
for certain aspects of securities actions, it did not intend to impress a
higher standard for pleading loss causation.126 The Ninth Circuit's in-
terpretation, which the Supreme Court rejected, coincided exactly
with the Committee's statement on loss causation. 127 Thus, the Su-
preme Court's interpretation ignored the Committee's instructions on
how courts should apply the PSLRA to loss causation.
B. Dura Decision Mistakenly Follows Common-Law Precedent
One thing is true about the Dura decision: it follows common-law
precedent. Securities fraud actions have long resembled common-law
misrepresentation actions, which require the plaintiff to demonstrate
that he suffered actual monetary damages.' 28 Congress and the Court
124. Id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
125. See Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 366
(2005) ("In a fraud-on-the-market case, plaintiffs establish loss causation if they have shown that
the price on the date of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation." (quoting Knapp
v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996))). Neither the Petitioner's brief nor the
Respondent's brief mentioned this section of the congressional hearing. The Solicitor General
did, however, mention the passage from the hearing in its amicus brief. Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *12, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.
336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 1205204 [hereinafter Solicitor General] ("Though it was not
relied upon by the court below, there is arguably some support for the Ninth Circuit's standard
in the legislative history of the PSLRA."). The Solicitor General admitted that the Committee's
example, "if construed to be an exhaustive description of the plaintiff's burden even in the fraud-
on-the-market context, would be essentially identical to the Ninth Circuit's standard." Id. The
Solicitor General, however, then dismissed the committee's statement as irrelevant, and inferred
that due to the lack of further explanation by Congress, Congress must not have fully considered
the loss causation issue and therefore that "lone sentence in the PSLRA's legislative history
[does not] reflect[ I . .. how loss causation is to be established in a Rule lOb-5 case." Id. The
Solicitor General's argument is specious; probably because the statement does not coincide with
the Solicitor General's opinion, it dismissed the congressional statement as immaterial. Unfortu-
nately, it appears that the Supreme Court and certain federal courts have set aside the legislative
history as quickly as the Solicitor General did.
126. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15, as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
127. See id., as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694; State of New Jersey, supra note 15, at
5.
128. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343-44 (2005).
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both acknowledge that securities fraud actions have had a long history
in the common law, and thus closely resemble common-law fraud
claims. 129
The Restatement (Second) of Torts pronounces that a person who
fraudulently persuades another to act or fail to act upon the fraud is
liable for any harm caused to the other through reliance on the
fraud.130 Hence, common law has long required plaintiffs to prove
that they in fact suffered an economic loss due to reliance on a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation.13 1 Also, the Restatement of Torts states that a
person who, through misrepresentation of the financial condition of a
129. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744 (1975) ("[I]t is not inap-
propriate to advert briefly to the tort of misrepresentation and deceit, to which a claim under
Rule lOb-5 certainly has some relationship.").
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
131. Dura, 544 U.S. at 343-44. This focus on "actually suffering a loss" is part of the reason
why so many people are worried about recovery for "in-and-out-buyers." See supra note 92.
Ninth Circuit case law and at least two commentators, however, believe that such alarm is un-
founded. The first is Professor Merritt B. Fox, who finds no concern of double recovery:
It is certainly true . .. that it would be a mistake to grant damages to [an in-and-out]
purchaser. The reason for not granting damages, however, is not that the purchaser did
not incur an injury at the time of purchase as a result of defendant's wrongful misstate-
ment; he did suffer an injury by having to pay more than he otherwise would have but
for the misstatement. The reason for not granting damages is that the purchaser has
received a benefit arising from the same wrong in an amount equal to the injury he
suffered earlier. Indeed, a bar on the payment of damages to the extent that the plain-
tiff recoups his injury by sale at a still inflated price is exactly the Ninth Circuit rule on
damages, one set out by Judge Sneed in his concurring opinion in Green v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., which is a standard textbook case on the matter. Thus any implica-
tion in the Court's opinion that the Ninth Circuit holding in Dura would have led to
such a purchaser receiving damages is unfounded.
Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 Bus. LAW. 1547, 1568-69 (2005) (citing Green v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-46 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring)).
A second commentator who does not fear double recovery is Harold S. Bloomenthal. See 2
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 39, § 29:54. Bloomenthal responded to the part of Justice Breyer's
Dura decision that concerned in-and-out trading by saying "no one claims that such an in and
out purchaser ... could recover damages. Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act ... provides that
,no person ... shall recover ... a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the
act complained of."' Id. (alterations in original) (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(a) (1997)). Bloo-
menthal cites support from a 1975 Ninth Circuit case, Blackie v. Barrack: "If the stock is resold
at an inflated price, the purchaser-seller's damages, limited by § 28(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) to 'actual damages,' must be diminished by the inflation he recovers from his pur-
chaser." Id. at § 29:54 n.14 (quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1975)).
A Ninth Circuit case, Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., also distinctly clarifies why in-and-out
traders would not cause a double recovery:
For in-and-out traders, on the other hand, both the time of purchase and the time of
sale are considered in determining recoverable damages .... If the purchaser sold at
[five dollars less than original inflated purchase price] (before the complete corrective
disclosure), the purchaser would nevertheless suffer a recoverable damage of $5. In-
stead of determining the damages at the date of purchase, therefore, a two-step process
is used when dealing with in-and-out traders. First, the spread between market price
and value of the stock at the time of purchase is determined. When the purchaser sells
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corporation, induces another to buy stock, is liable to the susceptible
purchaser for any loss that the buyer suffers when the public becomes
aware of the misrepresentation and the share price drops.132 In other
words, a plaintiff must plead and prove proximate causation. 133
The Court basically adopted the common-law teachings of fraud.
But Congress seemed to be tired of federal courts legislating from the
bench and promulgating common-law securities law standards, and
thus enacted the PSLRA to thwart such action by the courts. 134 While
Congress did not create a precise loss causation standard, this Note
argues that Congress did not intend for a higher pleading standard to
apply to loss causation.' 35 Since the Court relied upon decisions of
stricter lower courts, it adopted a tougher measure for loss causation
than Congress ever envisioned. 136 It appears that the Court, satisfied
with the status quo of the common law, decided that the Ninth Cir-
cuit's interpretation caused too many problems.1 37
the stock, the spread is again measured. If the spread has diminished, the purchaser
would recover the differences.
818 F.2d 1433, 1437 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987).
132. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 549 (1938). The notes after the Restatement address this
issue:
The measure of damages which the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is
entitled to recover from its maker as damages under the rule stated in § 525 is the
pecuniary loss which results from the falsity of the matter misrepresented, including (a)
the difference between the value of the thing bought, sold or exchanged and its
purchase price or the value of the thing exchanged for it, and (b) pecuniary loss suf-
fered otherwise as a consequence of the recipient's reliance upon the truth of the
representation.
Id.
133. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (8th ed. 2004) (defining proximate cause as "merely
the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences
of the actor's conduct .... [L]egal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so
closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing
liability").
134. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4-5 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683-84 ("The
lack of congressional involvement has left judges free to develop conflicting legal standards,
thereby creating substantial uncertainties and opportunities for abuses of investors, issuers, pro-
fessional firms and others. The Committee has determined that now is the time for Congress to
reassert its authority in this area.").
135. See supra notes 120-127 and accompanying text.
136. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
137. Professor Merritt B. Fox argues that not only was the Court wrong in stating that the
Ninth Circuit's approach lacked precedent, he also contends that the Court was wrong to rely on
common-law fraud actions. Fox, supra note 131, at 1570. "[T]he fraud-on-the-market theory,"
says Professor Fox, "is not a common law doctrine," and the Court's reliance on traditional
reliance-based actions like Emergent Capital Investment Management, L.L.C. v. Stonepath
Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003), and Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th
Cir. 1990), was faulty because the causal link between the defendant's harmful act and the plain-
tiff's harm is completely different in a reliance-based case versus a fraud-on-the-market action.
Fox, supra note 131, at 1570. Professor Fox points out that the court relied on only one fraud-on-
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C. Dura Decision Relies on Faulty Theories
Besides ignoring congressional intent and relying on common law,
the Court also based its decision on faulty principles. 138 One such
principle is that a loss may not occur without a decline in stock price.
Consider the following hypothetical: 139 A buys 1000 shares of stock
from company C at $10 a share (total value of A's investment is
$10,000). Misrepresentations by company C artificially inflated the
share price by $10. One month later, company C makes a corrective
disclosure regarding the misrepresentation, and at the same time,
company C unveils a revolutionary product that enhances public inter-
est in company C stock, which naturally leads to an increase in share
value. Assume that the corrective disclosure results in the share price
diminishing by $3, and assume that the product unveiling led to an
increase of $8 per share. Overall, A's stock will increase by $5 per
share for an overall gain of $5,000.
In the hypothetical, company C has still committed fraud, and in-
vestor A suffered a loss. But under the loss causation standard
adopted in Dura, a court would likely dismiss any action brought by
A. 140 In this context, the Court's interpretation of loss causation has
effectively stripped the PSLRA of much of its deterrent value. Com-
pany C can continue to defraud investors and hide its misrepresenta-
tions by disclosing them simultaneously with positive information; no
drop in price will occur, and common-law applications of loss causa-
tion will bar the plaintiff from any recovery. 141 While this argument is
admittedly abstract, it is entirely possible for this scenario to occur.
The other problem with basing loss causation on a subsequent de-
cline in stock value occurs when the corporation does not make an
immediate corrective disclosure, but rather makes a gradual disclosure
over a period of months. The Amicus Brief of City of New York Pen-
sion Funds et al. provides an example of how this would work:
the-market action, Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1997), and the
Court "fail[ed] to note that the 8th Circuit had adopted the same rule as the Ninth [Circuit]." Id.
138. Cf. Fox, supra note 131, at 1567 (arguing that in rejecting the Ninth Circuit's loss causa-
tion approach, "[tihe Court gives a number of reasons for reaching this conclusion. These rea-
sons, when subject to scrutiny, appear to be rather confused and so they unfortunately do not
provide much helpful guidance concerning how future courts should decide the open issues de-
lineated above.").
139. This hypothetical derives its origin from the arguments the United States as Amicus Cu-
riae developed. Solicitor General, supra note 125, at 13; see also Fox, supra note 131, at 1553
(examining the situation where the stock price at time of suit is higher than the stock price at
time of purchase, although not as high as it should have been had a misstatement not caused
inflation).
140. See Solicitor General, supra note 125, at *13.
141. Id.
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Assume, as above, that Company A releases false information that
its revenues were $1 billion and its profits were $250 million. As a
result, investors believe [A] will earn $300 million going forward, or
$3 per share. However, the actual undisclosed numbers were $750
million in revenues and a $200 million loss.... At the end of the six
months, [A] realizes it has a problem and will not be able to keep
booking the fictitious sales. Rather than disclose the truth about its
past practices, over the next few months, [A] gradually discloses
that it will only break-even over the next year. The stock price de-
clines to $10 based upon those deflated expectations. Investors do
not know that the deflation in the expectations is the result of a
fraud. 14
2
In the hypothetical above, at the end of the year, A reveals that its
information the previous year was false and that its more recent infor-
mation is accurate. 143 There is no immediate subsequent decline in
price because the market has already gradually incorporated the less-
ened expectations that A revealed. 144 Thus, if the shareholders of A
subsequently bring a fraud action against the corporation, they would
be unable to allege that the price of the stock dropped as a direct
result of a corrective disclosure. 145 Depending on how rigidly the
court applies loss causation pleading standards, the court may dismiss
the plaintiffs' meritorious claim because the unambiguous corrective
disclosure came too late. 146
Returning to the above hypothetical, assume that shareholder S-
having a hunch that A's initial announcement was fraudulent and that
the first subsequent statement by A was a corrective disclosure (albeit
a small one)-does bring a claim soon after the company releases its
first minor disclosure. In this scenario, if loss causation must be pled
with particularity-as the Court's ultimate holding suggests-then S
will have to claim that he is seeking only the minor damages that oc-
curred from that initial inconsequential disclosure. 47 Thus, S will be
reduced to receiving only a pittance if his claim succeeds, and A can
continue to release corrective disclosures gradually without fear that S
will be able to claim any of the subsequent drops in price.1 48 Were S,
142. Brief of City of New York Pension Funds et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents at 11-12, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932).
143. Id. at 12.
144. See id.
145. See id.; 5E ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE & REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS
§ 20:57 (2005) ("[AIII other factors being equal, the longer a company waits to correct an error,
the less the recoverable loss.").
146. See Fox, supra note 131, at 1556-59 (contemplating what other evidence, if any, a court
will allow a plaintiff to introduce in order to show that the misrepresentation inflated the stock
price where there is no substantial drop in price after a public announcement).
147. Cf. Dura Pharms.. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347-48 (2005).
148. Cf. 5E JACOBS, supra note 145, § 20:57.
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however, allowed to plead simply that he bought at an inflated
purchase price, he would be able to recover for all of the ongoing
price drops due to A's lengthy disclosure. 149 There is no risk to A not
knowing what total damages S eventually will seek, because A knows
how much of the value it exaggerated. And any speculation as to a
correlative drop in price should be a burden born by A because A was
the wrongdoer.
From these two hypotheticals it is clear that the standard for loss
causation should not require the plaintiff to plead with particularity a
subsequent decline in price. The plaintiff's calculation would inevita-
bly be speculative, and a court would either dismiss the claim or force
the plaintiff to accept inadequate compensation for his loss.150
D. The Supreme Court Squarely Renounced the Ninth Circuit's
View but Failed to Provide Any Guideposts as to What Was
Needed to Plead Loss Causation
The Court thoroughly condemned the Ninth Circuit's approach, but
failed to provide any guidance as to what is actually required to plead
loss causation. 151 The Court concluded only that the Ninth Circuit's
method varied from the common law, which required "that a plaintiff
prove that the defendant's misrepresentation (or other fraudulent
conduct) proximately caused the plaintiff's economic loss. '' 152 There-
fore, the Court said that it "need not, and [did] not, consider other
proximate cause or loss-related questions.1' 53
The Court determined that the plaintiffs' complaint inadequately
alleged proximate causation. 154 Because the complaint declared only
that the plaintiffs "paid artificially inflated prices for Dura's securi-
ties" and suffered "damages," 155 the Court found that the complaint
fell short of providing the defendants with "fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."'1 56 After
vaguely stating that a plaintiff who sustains a loss should be able "to
provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal
connection that the plaintiff ha[d] in mind," the Court's analysis es-
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
151. Fox, supra note 131, at 1552 ("The Court ... does not specify what kinds of allegations
and proofs would be sufficient to meet [loss causation pleading requirements].").
152. Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 347.
156. Id. at 346 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
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sentially ended. 57 It provided only nebulous clues as to what is suffi-
cient to plead loss causation.
The Court should not have abrogated the Ninth Circuit's approach
without offering guidance as to appropriate methods of alleging and
proving loss causation. The Court should use its opinions as a means
of clarifying issues instead of further muddying the waters.1 58 In
Dura, the Court merely managed to eliminate the Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach; therefore, the Dura decision has no effect on the methods em-
ployed by other circuits. 159 Hence, lower courts are free to be as
stringent as they desire, with an implied order from the Court to shy
away from any analysis that is too friendly to plaintiffs.
E. The Court Declined to Acknowledge Other Related
Securities Issues
Certain commentators claim that the Court did not answer all of the
prayers of 10b-5 defendants and their amici. 160 For example, the
Court did not endorse the defendant's argument that a "plaintiff must
allege 'a corrective disclosure followed by a stock price drop."1161
Commentators urge that "[h]ad the Court adopted defendants' pro-
posed requirement of a specific corrective disclosure of the truth-by
157. Id. at 347; see also Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP
Memoranda, 1501 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 721, 725
(2005) (stating that the Supreme Court "did not expressly articulate any single standard for
alleging and establishing loss causation").
158. Cf BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559. 602 (1996). Justice Scalia criticized the
Court's lack of clarity:
One might understand the Court's eagerness to enter [the punitive damages] field,
rather than leave it with the state legislatures, if it had something useful to say. In fact,
however, its opinion provides virtually no guidance to legislatures, and to state and
federal courts, as to what a "constitutionally proper" level of punitive damages might
be.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
The court recognized Dura's limited scope:
Dura itself does not define a pleading standard for loss causation; rather, it simply
rejects the Ninth Circuit's standard as overly permissive. Accordingly, the Second Cir-
cuit's standard-which certainly requires "a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss
to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that
the plaintiff has in mind,"-is undisturbed by Dura.
Id. (citation omitted).
160. See Alan Schulman & Niki Mendoza, Dura Pharm. [sic], Inc. v. Broudo-The Least of
All Evils, 1505 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 271, 273
(2005) ("[I]n the end, the unanimous Supreme Court opinion in Dura was not a bad decision for
plaintiffs-defendants got the price inflation theory win, and nothing else, and the plaintiffs' bar
ended up with the best of all possible non-prevailing scenarios.").
161. Id. at 273-74 (quoting Brief for the Petitioner at 10, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932)).
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confession or otherwise-linked to a drop in stock price, the pleading
hurdle could have been 'insurmountable. '" ' 162
Despite future 10b-5 defendants' possible disappointment by the
Court's decision, the situation does not seem as bright for plaintiffs as
certain commentators purport. First, the Court emphatically dis-
carded the Ninth Circuit's approach, 163 which could result in lower
courts steering clear of methodologies that seem similar to the Ninth
Circuit's prior loss causation holdings. Second, the Court explicitly
stated that if "the purchaser sells the shares quickly before the rele-
vant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will not have led
to any loss. ''164 That statement alone does not suggest that a plaintiff
will need to prove that a defendant made a corrective disclosure that
caused a successive drop in share price, but the market will have no
means of assimilating the discrepancy into the price until the defen-
dant releases some kind of statement or data. 165 When there is no
definite corrective disclosure, a problem arises because the more at-
tenuated and circumstantial the evidence, the harder it is for a plain-
tiff to prove proximate causation. 166 Add to this the Court's
conclusion that even when a purchaser does subsequently sell at a
lower price, economic factors other than the misrepresentation may
account for the decrease. 67 These factors imply that a plaintiff will
have to plead with specificity that the price drop was due to some
distinct corrective disclosure; when no such disclosure is present, the
pleading burden becomes insurmountable.
In addition, commentators have remarked optimistically that Justice
Breyer's discussion on the appropriate pleading standards of loss cau-
162. Id. at 274.
163. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005).
164. Id. at 342.
165. This fact is because of the efficient market theory: "A market in which prices always
fully reflect available information is an 'efficient' market." Christopher Paul Saari, Note, The
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory & the Regulation of the Securities Indus-
try, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (1977) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has adopted the
efficient market theory as accurate. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) ("Because
most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any
public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5
action.").
166. Due to the vague nature of proximate cause, judges routinely disagree as to where to
draw the line between actual causation and legal causation; perhaps the best demonstration of
this disagreement is Chief Justice Cardozo's majority opinion versus Justice Andrew's dissenting
opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99-101 (N.Y. 1928). This variance occurs
whenever courts apply proximate causation, as evidenced by the Second Circuit's and the Elev-
enth Circuit's approaches to loss causation. See supra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
167. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342-43.
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sation did not explicitly adopt a heightened pleading standard. 168 On
the surface, such an interpretation appears plausible, but in context it
seems to lose muster. Justice Breyer conceded that the federal plead-
ing rules should not create large obstacles for plaintiffs.169 But plain-
tiffs must provide securities fraud defendants with sufficient notice:
"[I]t should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an
economic loss to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss
and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind. '1 70 How
courts interpret "some" will be crucial to determining the pleading
burden lower courts will impose upon plaintiffs. Certainly, district
courts will fear being too lenient considering the Court's remarks that
"allowing a plaintiff to forgo giving any indication of the economic
loss and proximate cause.., would bring about harm of the very sort
the statutes seek to avoid,"1171 and "[s]uch a rule would tend to trans-
form a private securities action into a partial downside insurance pol-
icy."' 172 Such strong sentiments by the Court suggest that lower courts
should employ-although not Rule 9(b) heightened pleading stan-
dards' 73-at least stricter pleading standards. 174
Furthermore, the Court should have paid more attention to the
cases upon which it relied when explaining the pleading standard it
168. Schulman & Mendoza, supra note 160, at 277-78.
169. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-15 (2002)).
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 347-48.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
174. Commentators are genuinely concerned as to what pleading standard courts will employ
after the Dura decision. Consider the following passage Professor Fox wrote while analyzing
Dura:
The Court's holding in Dura is extremely narrow. It settles only one issue: We now
know that a plaintiff who merely alleges, and subsequently establishes, that a positive,
materially false misstatement in violation of Rule lOb-5 inflated the price she paid for a
security has not done enough to establish causation in a fraud-on-the-market action for
damages. The pleadings must provide in addition "some indication of the loss and the
causal connection the plaintiff has in mind." And proof at trial must provide evidence
that the inflated purchase price proximately caused an economic loss. The Court, how-
ever, does not specify what kinds of allegations and proofs would be sufficient to meet
these standards .... [Ils it necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove a price drop
immediately following the public announcement of the truth? Or can the pleadings or
proof at trial consist of some other kind of indication that the purchase price had been
inflated by the misstatement and that the market had later realized the true situation
dissipating this inflation?
Fox, supra note 131, at 1552-53 (citations omitted). Regarding Professor Fox's first rhetorical
question, if a court did require an immediate public corrective disclosure, then a plaintiff would
be hard-pressed to plead loss causation were the defendant company less than forthright in re-
vealing damning information. The second rhetorical question grants a plaintiff much more lee-
way in formulating its complaint. The problem, however, is that the Court's words in Dura point
toward applying a standard that resembles the former rather than the latter.
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adopted for loss causation. In particular, the Court cited to
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. as support for the proposition that Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not place too much of a burden
upon a plaintiff. 175 In Swierkiewicz, the Court reiterated that "Rule
8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions," except
where Rule 9(b) or Congress expressly places a higher pleading stan-
dard. 176 As already argued above,177 Congress did not explicitly place
such a standard on the loss causation element. For this reason, under
simplified 8(a) notice pleading, courts should "dismiss a complaint
only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts
that could be proved consistent with the allegations. 1 78 To be sure,
there are enough procedural safeguards among the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the PSLRA to prevent unmeritorious claims from
proceeding. 179 Therefore, the Court should have used-and lower
courts should prospectively use-a liberal pleading standard for loss
causation.
V. IMPACT
As with every Supreme Court case, the Dura decision will have
wide effects on the law and on people. The most direct effect will be
that lower courts will have to fashion their opinions on loss causation
to coincide with Dura. Courts like the Second Circuit that already
employ strict pleading standards may continue as if nothing changed,
or they may increase their standards, thus leading to more dismissals.
Courts like the Ninth Circuit, however, must increase their loss causa-
tion pleading and proof standards or search for a way to remain some-
what liberal under the Dura application. The real problem is that
Dura provided no guideposts as to what the actual pleading standard
175. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-15 (2002)).
176. 534 U.S. at 513.
177. See supra notes 120-127 and accompanying text.
178. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73
(1984)).
179. See id. ("If a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient
notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement under [Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure] 12(e) before responding. Moreover, claims lacking merit may be dealt with through sum-
mary judgment under Rule 56."). Under the PSLRA, Congress adopted a heightened pleading
standard for the scienter element. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000) ("[Tlhe complaint shall, with
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.").
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is, which will cause courts to take stabs in the dark as to the appropri-
ate standard.1 80
Moreover, it is likely that a number of courts will apply 9(b) height-
ened pleading standards to loss causation due to the Court's disparag-
ing critique of the Ninth Circuit's liberal approach. Yet the concern
does not end there. Because Dura referred to Rule 8(a) notice plead-
ing in general, courts may apply heightened pleading standards to nor-
mal cases that have nothing to do with securities law.181 The Dura
decision will have the effect of further confusing plaintiffs and increas-
ing the rate at which courts dismiss meritorious claims of all types.
This Part discusses how the ambiguity of the Dura decision will
cause further inconsistency among lower courts.1 82 It predicts that dis-
missal rates will increase as lower courts apply "heightened" pleading
standards to loss causation. 183 It also touches on how lower courts will
apply "heightened" pleading standards to cases beyond the securities
realm.184
A. Dura's Failure to Define a Pleading Standard for Loss
Causation Will Result in Continued Variance Among
Circuit and Lower Courts
The Court provided little direction as to what a plaintiff must plead
to illustrate how the public learned of a defendant's fraud and how
that "disclosure" caused a subsequent drop in price.' 85 The Court's
only references to what constitutes an exposure of fraud were phrases
like "the relevant truth begins to leak out" and "after the truth makes
its way into the market place.' 86 These words provide no guidance as
to whether the revelation must be a corrective disclosure, or whether
a plaintiff may claim that investors discovered the misrepresentation
in some other fashion.1 87 The Court implied that if there was no cor-
rective disclosure, then it will be difficult to prove loss causation be-
180. 2 BLOOMEN-r-lAL, supra note 39, § 29:54.10 ("It is likely that it will be years before the
questions left open by the Supreme Court's [Dural decision are resolved, with different courts
finding different aspects of the opinion to rationalize their rulings on motions to dismiss.").
181. See infra notes 236-250 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 185-202 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 203-235 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 236-250 and accompanying text.
185. Lyle Roberts & Paul Chalmers, Shining a Light or Cursing the Darkness?-The Impact of
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 1505 PRAcrIsING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAc. HANDBOOK SERIES
343, 351 (2005).
186. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
187. Roberts & Chalmers, supra note 185, at 351.
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cause "the longer the time between purchase and sale .... the more
likely that other factors caused the loss."188
The Ninth Circuit responded to Dura in In re Daou Systems Inc.
Securities Litigation, 89 implementing another liberal standard to de-
termine whether the plaintiff had adequately described the causal con-
nection. 190 In In re Daou, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant
company was recognizing revenue prematurely.' 91 But the plaintiffs
had not pled that the defendant had made any corrective disclosure,
so the lower court determined that loss causation had not been suffi-
ciently pled. 192 In spite of this, the Ninth Circuit found that the defen-
dant's stock prices began to fall abruptly after the defendant started to
reveal truthful figures of its financial condition. 193 Furthermore, the
court recited other allegations in the complaint that adduced that the
defendant made several announcements regarding its deteriorating
business and that such decline was "a result of prematurely and im-
properly recognizing revenues.' 94 Based on these allegations, the
Ninth Circuit concluded "that the foregoing allegations, if assumed
true, are sufficient to provide [the defendant] with some indication
that the drop in [the defendant's] stock price was causally related to
[the defendant's] financial misstatements reflecting its practice of pre-
maturely recognizing revenue before it was earned.' 95
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiff merely "to point
to a disclosure that deflate[d] the market's expectations about the
company" instead of requiring the plaintiff to indicate "a disclosure
revealing that the alleged misrepresentations were false when
made.' 96 In other words, if a company reveals that it is approaching
insolvency, but such a revelation does not divulge the existence of pre-
vious misrepresentations, the Ninth Circuit accepts this as sufficient to
link a decline in share price to an alleged fraud. 197
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit, a Fourth Circuit district court re-
cently held that a plaintiff must plead with particularity every element
of a lOb-5 claim, including loss causation. In In re First Union Corp.
Securities Litigation, the court looked to other circuits to determine
188. Dura, 544 U.S. at 343.
189. 411 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005).
190. Id. at 1030.
191. Id. at 1026; see also Roberts & Chalmers, supra note 185, at 352.
192. In re Daou, 411 F.3d at 1025-26.
193. Id. at 1026.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Roberts & Chalmers, supra note 185, at 352.
197. Id. at 352-53.
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whether loss causation pleadings must meet the particularity standard,
noting that the Fourth Circuit had never expressly stated that loss cau-
sation calls for a heightened pleading standard. 19 The court deter-
mined that "circuit courts that have considered the issue have held
that the particularity requirement applies to the loss causation ele-
ment of a Section 10(b) claim." 199 In addition, the court acknowl-
edged that the Fourth Circuit had previously held that a common-law
fraud plaintiff must plead every element of the fraud with particular-
ity 200-a comparison the court prided itself on, considering the Dura
Court had applied the same type of analogy. 201 After reaching the
conclusion that a heightened pleading standard applied, the court pre-
dictably dismissed the case. 202
B. Dismissal Rates Will Increase When Lower Courts Apply the
"Heightened" Pleading Standards
Not only will courts apply varying pleading standards to loss causa-
tion, but the majority of cases will probably apply "heightened" plead-
ing standards. The issue is whether loss causation is a "circumstance"
of securities fraud actions such that it must be pled with particular-
ity. 203 After Dura, it does not appear that any court has expressly
stated that a 9(b) pleading standard specifically applies to loss causa-
tion assessments, but courts have held that "heightened" pleading
198. No. Civ. 3:99CV237-H, 2006 WL 163616, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 2006).
199. Id. (citing Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d.690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005); GSC Partners CDO
Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). The Fifth Circuit held, in Plotkin, that to
demonstrate a lOb-5 violation, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant proximately caused the
plaintiff's injury. 407 F.3d at 696. The PSLRA, continued the court, "requires a securities fraud
plaintiff ... to plead [that] substantive element[ ] with particularity. The PSLRA's particularity
requirement incorporates, at a minimum, the pleading... under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b)." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
200. In re First Union, 2006 WL 163616, at *6 (citing Learning Works, Inc. v. Learning Annex,
Inc., 830 F.2d 541. 546 (4th Cir. 1987)).
201. Id. (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005)).
202. Id. at *7. The actual pleadings are not that significant; the important point is that the
court referred to Dura when deciding to use a heightened pleading standard. For reference,
however, the court noted that "[pilaintiffs concede[d] that the particularity requirement ap-
piie[d] to the other elements of their Section 10(b) claim, [but] they contend that because the
causation element concern[ed] the losses caused by the allegedly misleading statements, rather
than the statements themselves, simple notice pleading should [have] appl[ied] to that single
element." Id. at *6. The plaintiffs in In re First Union alleged that the stock price fell because of
two public statements and because of the acquisition of a company. Id. However, the price drop
occurred after the public statements but before the acquisition of the company; thus, the court
held that the plaintiffs failed to particularly plead loss causation and accordingly dismissed the
case. Id. at *6-7.
203. Roberts & Chalmers, supra note 185, at 354.
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standards apply,20 4 and the varying applications will undoubtedly lead
to and require a unifying judgment. And although a court may not
explicitly state that it is using a heightened pleading standard, a num-
ber of cases appear to be doing just that.
A Northern District of California case (which, if appealed, is within
the purview of the Ninth Circuit), In re Gilead Sciences Securities Liti-
gation,20 5 exemplifies the unyielding standards that some lower courts
will now apply to loss causation pleading. The plaintiffs in In re Gil-
ead alleged in their pleadings that the defendant announced in July
2003 that it expected its second quarter results to exceed expectations
due to increased sales of its new HIV/AIDS drug, Viread, and not
because of swelling inventory stockings.206 Two weeks later, allegedly,
the defendant informed analysts and investors during a conference
call that its inventory had increased noticeably and that Viread sales
would decrease in the third-quarter. 207 Then, on August 7, 2003, the
defendant publicized a letter from the FDA that warned the defen-
dant of its promotional practices. 208 On October 28,' 2003, the defen-
dant released its third-quarter numbers, which were drastically lower
than second-quarter results.209 The defendant's stock plummeted
$7.46 a share the following day, although it regained its value a month
later.210
The plaintiffs' primary allegation was that the defendants carried
out "off-label marketing 211 as early as September 2001, and that such
improper marketing caused the defendant to overstate its second-
quarter Viread sales results by roughly ninety-five million dollars.2 12
The defendants moved to dismiss, countering that the 'plaintiffs failed
204. See, e.g., In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2005) ("To make out a
securities fraud claim under section 10(b), a plaintiff must show that ... 'the plaintiff's reliance
on the defendant's misstatement caused him or her injury."' (quoting Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret.
Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004))). "These requirements are heightened by
the PSLRA, which requires that the complaint 'state with particularity all facts on which [plain-
tiff's] belief is formed."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000)).
205. No. C 03-4999 MJJ, 2005 WL 2649200 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2005).
206. Id. at *1.
207. Id. at *1-2.
208. Id. at *2 & n.1.
209. Id. at *1-2 (stating that defendant's second quarter revenues were $230.7 million, with
$167 million coming from Viread, while its third quarter revenues were $194.1 million, with
$115.4 million coming from Viread).
210. Id. at *2.
211. "Off-label marketing refers to the use for marketing purposes of information such as the
result of clinical studies and other materials on the uses of and the efficacy of an FDA-approved
product that has not been approved by the FDA for inclusion in the product's package labeling."
In re Gilead, 2005 WL 2649200, at *2.
212. Id. at *3.
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to adequately plead loss causation because the defendant divulged the
FDA's letter in August 2003, but the drop in share price did not tran-
spire until October 29, 2003.213 In reply, the plaintiffs claimed that the
FDA letter caused the defendant's national sales, which were alleg-
edly comprised of off-label sales, to decline significantly.2 14 The FDA
letter had alerted doctors to the safety problems of Viread, which con-
sequently made them "less inclined to prescribe Viread. ''2 15 Hence,
the plaintiffs contended that the FDA letter, which caused the drop in
the October sales report, triggered the twelve percent stock price
drop.2 16
The court found the plaintiff's contentions "too attenuated to with-
stand scrutiny under Dura."217 Essentially, the court decided that the
plaintiff had not met the proximate cause standard for loss causation
that the Supreme Court had adjudicated. The court justified its deci-
sion by stating that the defendant's stock price in fact rose following
the disclosure of the FDA letter.218 Such justification, however, is log-
ically flawed. If the plaintiffs' allegations were true-as a court must
assume on a motion to dismiss-then the fact that the stock price did
not immediately decrease makes sense. The FDA letter would have
first caused doctors to shy away from prescribing Viread, sales would
have subsequently decreased, and then the dismal sales report of Oc-
tober 28 would have been a direct result of the FDA letter. Yet the
court demonstrated that it took Dura's words too literally:
Plaintiffs do not allege that a price drop immediately accompanied
the disclosure of the FDA warning letter, and hence the Court is left
to speculate as to what portion of the eventual loss, if any, should be
attributed to the disclosure or whether the loss was caused by other
factors. 219
Because there was no immediate drop in stock price, the court de-
cided that the plaintiffs had not met the loss causation standard and
dismissed the case.
A Connecticut district court was similarly harsh in Malin v. XL
Capital Ltd.220 In Malin, the plaintiffs attempted to distinguish their
complaint from Dura, arguing that they met the loss causation plead-
ing standard by alleging that they bought at an inflated price, that the
213. Id. at *8.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. In re Gilead, 2005 WL 2649200, at *8.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
220. No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2005).
20061
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
defendant's misrepresentations caused the inflated price, that the
stock price dropped, and that a corrective disclosure caused the price
drop.221 The court initially viewed these averments as sufficient for
the Dura pleading standard. 222
Nonetheless, the court noted that the defendants had presented evi-
dence that the stock price had rebounded to its predisclosure value
two-and-a-half months after the disclosure. 223 The court decided that
the fact that the stock price recovered in less than three months de-
feated the inference that the defendants' misrepresentations caused
the economic loss. 2 24 The court then proclaimed, "[i]f the current
value [of the security] is commensurate to the purchase prices, there is
no loss, regardless of whether the purchase price was artificially in-
flated. ' 225 The court's reasoning is problematic in that there are many
reasons that might account for a fall and subsequent rise in stock
price, namely the advent of a new product, the downfall of a rival, or
an overall improved economy.226 Based solely on the court's opinion,
it appears that the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim only because
the stock price recouped to the value of the inflated price.227 Such an
approach to loss causation validates the fear that a defendant may
avoid any and all liability for fraud by releasing enough positive infor-
mation at the same time as a corrective disclosure to assure that the
stock price does not diminish.
The cases mentioned above are only the tip of the iceberg; a pleth-
ora of recent cases have applied heightened pleading standards to loss
causation. A Delaware district court began one of its opinions with a
long recitation of how the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) partic-
ularity requirement "has been rigorously applied in securities fraud
221. Id. at *3.
222. Id.
223. Id. at *4.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Cf. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336. 342-43 (2005). The court noted other
factors affecting price:
When [a] purchaser subsequently resells ... shares ... at a lower price, that lower price
may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances,
changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions,
or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that
lower price.
ld.
227. See Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4. Perhaps the court was privy to facts that allowed it to
rule out that any factor other than the misrepresentation itself ultimately had an effect on the
market price, but the court did not disclose such facts in its opinion. See generally id.
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cases. '228 The plaintiff in Brashears v. 1717 Capital Management al-
leged that he was duped into purchasing a more expensive life insur-
ance policy because he had not been informed of the more economical
policy.22 9 The court concluded that although the plaintiff had paid
more in premium, he had also received the increased benefit of that
insurance plan, so he was not in a worse situation-just a different
one.230 That opinion is an example of a court blindly and literally ap-
plying the Dura standard. The court failed to examine the problem in
its simplest form: the defendant omitted key facts that induced the
plaintiff to pay more money than what he would have paid had he
been aware of the omission. Hence, the plaintiff suffered a loss.
The Sixth Circuit's formalistic approach in D.E. &J. Ltd. Partnership
v. Conaway almost appears naive.231 In Conaway, the complaint al-
leged that the defendant, Kmart, hid its financial difficulties from its
investors by using interim financial statements that did not adequately
report Kmart's financial state and misstating inventory ledgers. 232
Kmart quickly filed for bankruptcy, citing "a combination of factors,
including a rapid decline in its liquidity ... and earnings performance
in the fourth quarter" as the cause.233 The court accepted Kmart's
reasons for failure at face value: "[O]f course, the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition by itself does not a security fraud allegation make. '234
Yet at the dismissal stage, a court is supposed to accept the plaintiff's
allegations as true-not the defendant's contentions.2 35 Apparently
there is the potential for a defendant in the Sixth Circuit to fraudu-
lently run his company into the ground, hide it from his investors,
merely state that he lost money because business was bad, and be free
and clear of any securities fraud liability. It would be nice to live in a
world where a corporation would never lie, but the mere existence of
10b-5 securities fraud actions tends to show that such a dream will
never become reality.
228. Brashears v. 1717 Capital Mgmt., No. Civ.A. 02-1534-KAJ, 2005 WL 2585247, at *2 (D.
Del. Oct. 13, 2005) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417 (3d
Cir. 1997)).
229. Id. at *4.
230. Id.
231. 133 Fed. App'x 994 (6th Cir. 2005).
232. Id. at 996.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1000.
235. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
164 (1993) ("We review here a decision granting a motion to dismiss, and therefore must accept
as true all the factual allegations in the complaint.").
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C. Dura Will Cause Lower Courts to Apply Semi-Heightened
Pleading Standards to Nonsecurities Cases
Besides adversely affecting securities claims, the Dura decision will
influence lower courts to apply heightened pleading standards to
claims outside of the securities field. 236 This follows from the Court's
exacting application of the Rule 8(a) pleading standard. 237 The
Court's exact words were "[w]e concede that ordinary pleading rules
are not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff. But it should
not prove burdensome for a plaintiff. . . to provide a defendant with
some indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff
has in mind. ' 238 Because the Court referred to Rule 8 notice pleading
in general, and because all federal claims-unless otherwise indicated
by statute-are pled using Rule 8(a) standards,239 Dura's decision di-
rectly applies to the vast majority of federal claims.
A Florida district court was one of the first courts to apply Dura's
heightened Rule 8(a) pleading standard to a nonsecurities case in Al-
lied Van Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Shores Moving & Storage, Inc.2 40 That
case involved contract and conversion claims, but no securities fraud
claims.241 The court stated that "[w]hile the federal notice pleading is
liberal, it is not without limits," and subsequently dismissed the con-
version claim. 242 The court never recited the actual allegations; it
merely stated that "there [were] no factual allegations as to any of
these individual defendants which would state a cause of action for
conversion under Illinois law."' 243 However, the actual pleadings are
not significant; what is relevant is that the court decided to reference
Dura when deciding that notice pleading should not be too liberal.244
The Allied Van Lines case is a concrete example of a lower court look-
ing to Dura for guidance outside the securities fraud context.
236. Richard A. Spehr & Joseph De Simone, The Battleground After Dura Decision, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 22, 2005, at S6 ("Lower courts may apply the recently invigorated Rule 8 to any cause
of action.").
237. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).
238. See id. at 347 (citation omitted).
239. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The rules requirements are simple:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, . . . (2) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a
demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.
Id.
240. No. 2:05-CV-112-FTM29DNF, 2005 WL 1027463 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005).
241. Id. at *1.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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A New York court has similarly applied a demanding Rule 8(a)
standard to a racial discrimination suit. In Baptiste v. The W Hotel,
245
the plaintiff was an African-American woman who went to the defen-
dant hotel to visit her friend who was staying there. 246 She alleged
that employees of the defendant hotel subjected her to abuse and dis-
crimination on the basis of sex and race by verbally ridiculing her and
muttering racial epithets.2 47 The defendants moved to dismiss, and
the court began its opinion by quoting Dura: "[P]leadings are to give
'fair notice' of a claim and 'the grounds upon which it rests.' , 248 The
court quickly decided that the plaintiff's allegations were not detailed
enough to provide fair notice. 249 Referring to Dura, the court stated
that the plaintiff "ha[d] pointed to no facts or circumstances, other
than the fact that she is African-American, that would [have] give[n]
the W fair notice of the grounds from which one could infer that her
treatment by The W's staff was motivated by racial animus. ' 250 Ap-
parently, alleging the use of a racial epithet is not enough to plead
racial motivation under the heightened 8(a) pleading standard of
Dura; thus, the New York court was able to make a hasty dismissal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Securities law is a complex field that has continually piqued the in-
terest of both Congress and the Supreme Court. As a result, both of
these branches of government have written and imposed regulations,
primarily with the intent of preventing plaintiffs and their attorneys
from profiting off of frivolous or vexatious lawsuits. Such focus has
resulted in 10b-5 claims having little deterrent effect, perhaps evi-
denced by the WorldCom and Enron scandals.
In 1996, when Congress conducted committee hearings and codified
securities law in the PSLRA, Congress explicitly stated that it wanted
to end judicial legislation and consequently provide uniformity to se-
curities law. For that reason, federal courts, and particularly the Su-
preme Court, should have given deference and merit not only to the
PSLRA itself, but to the rationale behind its passage. Congress's
words were not left on deaf ears, because the Ninth Circuit employed
the exact standard of loss causation that the Committee suggested in
the PSLRA hearings. The Dura Court nevertheless gave little weight
245. No. 04 Civ. 5544(DLC), 2005 WL 1020779 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2005).
246. Id. at *1.
247. Id.
248. Id. at *2 (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005)).
249. Id. at *4.
250. Id.
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to the committee hearings and instead adopted the more stringent
common-law viewpoints.
Besides applying the burdensome common-law approaches, the
Court also relied upon faulty theories of loss causation in reaching its
decision. The Dura opinion requires that a plaintiff allege and prove
that the stock price dropped as a proximate result of the fraud's dis-
closure. The Court never explicitly says that there must be a definitive
corrective disclosure, but it states that as more time elapses between
the fraud and the drop in price, the more likely that factors other than
the fraud caused the drop in price. Those words imply that a plaintiff
will have to tie the price drop to a specific event or disclosure-and a
recent event, as well-lest he risk the chance of dismissal as the chain
of proximate cause attenuates. Moreover, the words of the Court de-
note that in complex situations, like the atmosphere that typically sur-
rounds securities fraud, all the cards are stacked against the plaintiff
because he has the burden of sifting the fraud and resultant share
price drop from other market forces-and then pleading the details
with particularity.
Increased dismissal rates will be the first and most obvious result of
Dura. Next, due to the vague language of the Dura opinion, confu-
sion will permeate the lower courts. Some courts will be applying
heightened pleading standards while other courts will be doing their
best, within the confines of Dura, to aid meritorious plaintiffs. And
finally, lower courts will apply heightened 8(a) pleading standards to
cases outside the realm of securities fraud since the Court's opinion
"touched upon" federal notice pleading. Perhaps the only way people
can effectively avoid suffering losses from securities fraud is by never
purchasing stock.
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